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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of tax haven operations on the tax liabil-
ities of corporate groups headquartered in 15 OECD countries. Using con-
solidated accounting data from ORBIS (2003–2007), this work finds that, at
the mean, an additional tax haven subsidiary reduces tax liabilities over total
assets by 7.4 per cent in the long run. At the mean, the marginal effective
tax rate (ETR) of a corporate group with tax haven subsidiaries is one per-
centage point lower than it is for groups without low-tax offshore operations.
The results also show that the marginal ETR of companies headquartered
in countries with a territorial system is lower than that of companies head-
quartered in jurisdictions with a worldwide system of taxation on corporate
profits. More specifically, corporate groups headquartered in the United
States have the highest marginal ETR.
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1 Introduction
The debate on the role of tax havens has lately gained great momentum,
beyond any expectations one might have entertained at the beginning of
2008. In the wake of the credit crunch and the following severe economic
downturn, with heavy government intervention, declining tax revenues, and
pleas for new market regulation, pressure on tax havens has mounted to
unprecedented levels. Under the threat of being placed on an OECD black-
list of “jurisdictions that have not committed to internationally agreed tax
standard” on transparency, low-tax countries agreed just before the Group
of Twenty (G20) meeting of April 2009 to curtail bank secrecy rules. The
affected countries include Switzerland, Monaco, and Liechtenstein; tradi-
tionally they have been very reluctant to amend their rules on bank secrecy
and the exchange of information. In May 2009, Andorra, Liechtenstein, and
Monaco were removed from the OECD list of uncooperative tax havens, af-
ter agreeing on a timetable to implement the standards of transparency and
effective exchanges of information set out by the organisation. Now more
and more low-tax jurisdictions are signing treaties in accordance with the
OECD principles on tax matters. In June 2009, Bermuda signed its twelfth
treaty (with the Netherlands) crossing the OECD threshold between being
a tax haven or not. The OECD moved Bermuda to a list of jurisdictions
that have substantially implemented the internationally agreed tax standard.
This is the list which includes Group of Eight (G8) countries. A month later,
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Luxembourg signed its twelfth treaty with Norway. These are the first tax
treaties satisfying OECD guidelines ever signed by Luxembourg with another
OECD member (OECD (2009)). In August 2009, the Cayman Islands and
the British Virgin Islands signed their twelfth bilateral agreements with New
Zealand and they now also appear in the OECD list of jurisdictions that
have substantially implemented the internationally agreed tax standard. At
28 August 2009, the OECD list of jurisdictions that have not committed to
internationally agreed tax standard was empty. These developments concern
mainly evasion of personal taxation; therefore they are not likely to affect tax
avoidance by multinational corporate groups. They are nonetheless a sign
that in recent months tax havens have come under unprecedented pressure.
More relevant for corporations, in May 2009 the US Presidency announced
measures which could reduce the incentives for corporations to shift profits
to tax havens. The measures aim at preventing the use of the check-the-box
rules to avoid Sub-part F regulations for intra-group debt1. Additionally,
they would disallow expenses deductions associated with deferred foreign
profits and they would introduce a pooling system of foreign tax credits
which should reduce tax planning of multinationals (Shaviro (2009)).2
1Sub-part F of the US Internal Revenue Code was introduced in 1962 and it prescribes
that certain income earned by a controlled foreign corporation has to be taxed, even if it
is not repatriated (for example, income from intra-group loans). The check-the-box rules
introduced in 1996 allow for choosing whether certain entities are to be treated as separate
corporations for US tax purposes. The rules have unintentionally weakened Sub-part F
(Shaviro (2009)).
2The measures are likely to be included in the 2009 US budget document. They have
2
Critics of these proposals argue that the measures will reinforce the deviation
of the US tax system from those of most other countries. After Japan and
the United Kingdom adopted a territorial (exemption) system in 2009, the
United States remained the only major country with a worldwide taxation
system on corporate income (credit system). Under a territorial system which
exempts foreign profits, companies have an incentive to maximise overall the
group profit by locating their real activities and by shifting some of their
earnings into low-tax jurisdictions. Under a worldwide system of taxation,
this incentive is smaller as foreign profits are taxed at the same rate as do-
mestic profits when they are repatriated (Dharmapala (2008)). This could
imply a higher tax burden for companies headquartered in credit countries.
Critics of tax havens argue that offshore tax centres erode tax revenues,
undermine fair competition, and dangerously reduce transparency. Other
analysts suggest that even though tax haven activity might reduce the tax
burden of multinational companies (MNCs), it enhances economic activity
in nearby non-haven countries by lowering the cost of capital (Desai et al.
(2006a); Dharmapala (2008)). But are offshore low-tax jurisdictions really
important in reducing the tax burden of multinational groups and hence in
eroding the tax base of higher-tax countries?
to be approved by the Congress. For more details on the US legislation and the proposed
changes, see Shaviro (2009).
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This paper studies whether in the aggregate MNCs are successful in reduc-
ing their tax liabilities by shifting profits in tax havens. More specifically,
it identifies the effect of tax haven operations on the group tax bill, and it
investigates whether the presence of group operations in offshore low-tax ju-
risdictions reduce the tax burden of the corporate group.
Despite a variety of contributions on the extent to which multinational com-
panies shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions through manipulation of transfer-
prices and (or) debt financing,3 direct evidence of the effect of tax haven
operations on tax liabilities is minimal. The emerging small body of litera-
ture focuses mainly on US-owned companies (with the exception of Markle
and Shackelford (2009)).
This paper compares the marginal effective tax rate (ETR) of corporate
groups headquartered in credit countries with that of groups headquartered
in exemption countries, where the marginal ETR measures the increase in the
tax liabilities when accounting profits increase by one US dollar. Corporate
3For contributions that report findings of direct evidence of transfer-pricing activities
among US multinationals, see Swenson (2001); Clausing (2003); Bernard et al. (2006).
Altshuler and Grubert (2002) and Desai et al. (2004), among others, find direct evidence
of debt shifting with US data. Huizinga et al. (2008) report evidence of debt shifting using
European data from AMADEUS. For more information on the dataset, see Table A.10 in
Maffini (2007). Several researchers find direct evidence of debt shifting using the German
Bundesbank MiDi dataset (see Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005); Buettner et al. (2006);
Buettner and Wamser (2009)). For more information on the dataset, see Table A.13 in
Maffini (2007).
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groups whose ultimate owner is resident in jurisdictions with a worldwide
system are characterized by a higher ETR. In particular, companies head-
quartered in the United States display the highest ETR.
The analysis is carried out by merging two datasets: ORBIS and ZEPHYR.
ORBIS contains accounting data derived from profit and loss (P&L) accounts
and balance sheet items. In the online version of ORBIS used here, for each
global ultimate owner, the country of residence of its first-level subsidiaries
is available.4 ZEPHYR contains information on M&A deals which may have
changed the ownership structure of the group. Information includes acqui-
sition and (or) sell-off of affiliates in tax havens. Therefore, a time-varying
ownership structure can be created by merging ORBIS with ZEPHYR. Our
sample consists of about 3,400 ultimate owners between 2003 and 2007 lo-
cated in 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom, and the United States. A common problem of
the previous literature is that the effect of tax haven operations on tax lia-
bilities is not identified properly because of endogeneity issues which are not
tackled. The decision to boost or to reduce tax haven activity is likely to
be influenced by both unobserved group fixed effects such as the ability of
the tax department, and by unobservable time-varying shocks likely to affect
4The online version of ORBIS contains information on second- and further-level sub-
sidiaries but it is not possible to download it in a format which can be processed with a
standard econometric softwares.
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the tax liabilities simultaneously. Desai et al. (2006b) control for group fixed
effects but none of the studies in the literature controls for the simultaneous
determination of the tax bill and of tax haven activities. By merging two
datasets and creating a time-varying ownership structure, this cross-country
research is able to investigate tax payments of corporate groups with tax
haven operations, whilst dealing with the identification issues underlying the
relationship between offshore low-tax operations and tax liabilities.
Differently to Desai et al. (2006b), this paper employs consolidated accounts
and therefore it identifies the determinants of the tax liabilities of the group
instead of the single affiliate. Unconsolidated accounts could lead to an over-
estimation of the ETR. Suppose company A owns a subsidiary B located in a
tax haven. Suppose that A borrows US$ 100 from B and pays 10 per cent in-
terest. The parent company can deduct interest payments from its tax base.
If in the home country the statutory corporate tax rate is 30 per cent and A
reports a pre-tax profit of US$ 100, then its ETR is 30 per cent.5 Suppose
additionally that B reports profits only from interest payments received, and
that its relevant statutory corporate tax rate is zero. If consolidated data
are used, the profit of the tax haven subsidiary will be added to the profit of
the parent and the ETR will drop to 27 per cent.6 Additionally, unconsol-
idated data only give a partial picture of how offshore low-tax jurisdictions
5[ 0.3∗(100−10)(100−10) ] = 0.30.
6[ 0.3∗(100−10)(100−10)+10 ] = 0.27.
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affect tax liabilities. In fact, a reduction in the tax bill of one affiliate could
be compensated for by an increased tax bill somewhere else in the group.
By failing to provide information on the tax liabilities of the whole group,
unconsolidated accounts are not suitable for comparing the tax burdens of
corporate groups resident in exemption countries with the tax burdens of
companies headquartered in credit countries.
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section
3 presents the data used in the empirical section. Section 4 develops the
empirical model and discusses various econometric issues. Section 5 presents
the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
The emerging literature can be partitioned into the accounting literature
describing country- or group-level ETRs (Markle and Shackelford (2009);
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009)) and the studies trying to establish a causal re-
lationship between affiliate-level tax payments and the tax haven operations
of multinational firms (Desai et al. (2006b)). The accounting literature is
descriptive because it does not control for observable characteristics of the
firm such as profitability, which clearly affects tax liabilities.
The accounting literature employs consolidated data whilst Desai et al. (2006b)
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employ unconsolidated confidential affiliate-level data. Unfortunately, as dis-
cussed in Section 1, unconsolidated data fail to provide a complete picture
of the real tax burden faced by a corporate group.
The literature differs across various dimensions but it has a common, impor-
tant problem. The common actor is that it does not deal with identification
issues arising from the simultaneous determination of tax liabilities and off-
shore low-tax operations. This implies that the effect of tax haven operations
is not correctly identified.
Markle and Shackelford (2009) describe country-level ETRs between 1988
and 2007 for 85 different countries. They employ consolidated accounting
data from OSIRIS.7 The authors distinguish aggregate country-level ETRs
between domestic and multinational firms using time-invariant ownership in-
formation for 2008. OSIRIS contains information on tax haven subsidiaries.
Given the time-invariant nature of the ownership information, the research
employs a pooled OLS. Markle and Shackelford (2009) calculate the ETR
as the ratio of book total tax expenses divided by net income before taxes
(NIBT). They employ only companies with positive NIBT and positive tax
charges.8 Regressing the ETR on a set of country dummies identifying the
7OSIRIS is also produced by Bureau van Dijk. It contains financial information for
listed companies, banks, and insurance companies around the world. For more information
on the dataset, see Table A.10 in Maffini (2007).
8As explained in Section 4, this might lead to sample selection bias.
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location of the ultimate owner and of its subsidiaries, the authors find that
the ETR of corporate groups with tax haven affiliates is 0.5 percentage points
lower than the ETR of the ultimate owners without low-tax offshore oper-
ations.9 More specifically, the ETR of US firms with offshore low-tax op-
erations is between 0.1 per cent and 0.7 per cent lower than that of US
companies without tax haven operations. For UK multinationals, the ETR
of those with tax haven operations is between 0.1 per cent and 0.2 per cent
lower than the ETR of companies without offshore low-tax jurisdictions. For
countries with a territorial system such as France and Germany, the ETR of
the multinationals with tax haven operations is 2.4 per cent and 0.1 per cent
lower, respectively, than the ETR of companies without tax haven operations.
Also, within the same country multinationals overall do not seem to enjoy a
lower ETR than do domestic companies, but multinationals domiciled in tax
havens have a slightly lower worldwide ETR, as explained above.10 Markle
and Shackelford (2009) also investigate whether companies headquartered in
credit countries have a higher ETR with respect to companies headquartered
in exemption countries. They do not report results for this analysis. They
simply say that the additive dummy recording whether the ultimate owner
is resident in a credit country is not statistically significant.
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) estimate the worldwide, federal, and foreign tax
9The only exception is Japan.
10Markle and Shackelford (2009).
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burdens on the corresponding worldwide, domestic, and foreign incomes of
US-owned multinationals. They use a panel of consolidated accounting data
from Compustat for the period 1995 to 2007.11 The time-varying presence
of a corporate group in low-tax jurisdictions is derived from Exhibit 21 of
form 10-K submitted to the US Security and Exchange Commission. Form
10-K is an annual report that publicly traded companies incorporated in the
United States are required to submit according to the US federal securities
laws. The form contains business and financial information, including au-
dited financial statements. In particular, Exhibit 21 gathers information on
the subsidiaries of the registrant, including their name and location. Using
an OLS estimator, the authors find that the effect of tax haven operations
on the worldwide tax charges of US multinationals is small. The worldwide
ETR (inclusive of US state taxes) for US multinationals is about 36 per cent.
For groups with at least one subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction, the ETR is
one and a half percentage points lower than the ETR of other MNCs. For-
eign taxes on the foreign income of US multinationals are on average 26 per
cent, but for groups with tax haven operations the foreign ETR is about 3.2
percentage points lower than the ETR of companies without those low-tax
operations. The paper also finds that the federal tax on foreign profits is on
average 4.4 per cent with no significant difference between companies with
and without tax haven operations. This measures the US federal taxes on
repatriated profits. Operations in low-tax jurisdictions do not seem to in-
11For more information on Compustat, see Table A.9 in Maffini (2007).
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fluence the federal ETR on domestic profits which is 36 per cent at the mean.
The aforementioned studies are descriptive. They do not establish a causal
relationship between tax haven operations and the tax burden. The pres-
ence in tax havens could be proxying some other characteristics such as the
unobserved ability of the tax department to reduce the fiscal burden of the
group effectively,12 or the observable size and profitability of the company
over which they do not have controlled. Also, the presence in tax havens
could be determined at the same time as the tax burden. In this context,
to prove a causal relationship between the fiscal burden of a multinational
group and its low-tax subsidiaries, one has to control for the heterogeneity
of observable characteristics such as profitability, intangibles intensity, and
size and for unobservable characteristics such as the aggressiveness of the tax
department. To this aim, a time-varying ownership structure is useful as this
allows the researcher to control for the unobservable group-level fixed effects.
Desai et al. (2006b) provide a quantification of the extent to which tax haven
operations reduce the tax burden of affiliates of US multinationals. Using
group dummies and affiliate dummies, they control for unobserved fixed ef-
fects. Unfortunately, they do not control for the endogeneity of the decision
to set up operations in an offshore low-tax jurisdiction even if the data con-
12In this case, one would attribute a lower tax bill to the presence in tax havens when
in fact, the ability of the tax department determines both the tax bill and the decision to
locate some operations offshore.
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tain a time-varying ownership structure. They employ a panel of unconsol-
idated confidential accounts of US-owned affiliates for the period from 1982
to 1999. The data are drawn from the affiliate-level confidential data of the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis.13 The authors find that US firms use tax
haven operations to reduce their domestic and foreign tax bills. In general,
affiliates whose parent company owns operations in offshore regional tax cen-
tres reduce their ratio of taxes to sales by about 2 per cent with respect to
companies without operations in regional tax havens. More specifically, the
authors distinguish operations between small tax havens such as the Cayman
Islands and large tax havens such as Ireland and Switzerland. The presence
only in regional small tax havens reduces the tax bill by less than the broader
ownership of tax havens. At the same time, companies with many low-tax
affiliates are more likely to have operations in small tax havens, whilst groups
with many subsidiaries located in high-tax countries are more likely to have
operations in large tax havens also. The authors argue that these findings
are consistent with affiliates in large low-tax countries such as Ireland and
Switzerland being used to shift profits away from high-tax locations, and with
affiliates in small tax havens being employed to defer US taxation. Desai et al.
(2006b) also show that companies with operations in offshore territories (or
belonging to a group which owns subsidiaries in tax havens) are larger, more
international, and have extensive intra-firm trade and higher R&D intensity.
13For more information on the dataset, see Table A.12 in Maffini (2007).
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3 Data
This paper investigates the effect of tax haven operations on group tax pay-
ments using ORBIS, a database recording balance sheet and profit and loss
account items for companies all over the world. The dataset is created by
Bureau van Dijk and is based on the mandatory information from filed and
publicly available accounts.14 The online version of ORBIS used here15 in-
cludes only large and very large companies.16 The unit of observation is a
group of companies which file consolidated accounts together and under the
name of a parent company, called the global ultimate owner (GUO). The
GUO is a company that ultimately owns at least one subsidiary (with at
least a share of more than 50 per cent of capital). For the definition used
by Bureau van Dijk, at least one of the shareholders of the GUO must be
known and this shareholder cannot own more than 50 per cent.
The sample consists of 3,389 industrial corporate groups17 over five years
(2003–2007) for a total of 12,876 observations distributed across 15 OECD
countries.18 The distribution of the observations across years is shown in
14For more information on the dataset, see Table A.10 in Maffini (2007).
15The version of ORBIS used in this paper has been accessed on 16 October 2008.
16Bureau van Dijk defines large and very large companies as those having operating
revenue greater than 13 million $US (10 million EUR) or total assets greater than 26
million $US (20 million EUR) or a number of employees greater then 150 headcounts.
17This excludes GUOs which are insurance companies, financial companies, banks, hedge
funds, private equity firms, venture capital firms, mutual and pension funds, and public
authorities. The different sectors represented in the sample are showed in Table 1.
18For more details on the sample construction, see Table 2.
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Table 3. There are large differences in the number of companies reported for
each country (see Table 4). Differences are due to different reporting require-
ments and different industrial structures. For example, France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States have large multinationals, whilst countries
such as Spain are characterised by smaller and less internationalised groups.
US and UK global ultimate owners represent about 55 per cent and 19 per
cent of the sample respectively, together forming a total of almost 75 per
cent. More than half of the remaining quarter are German, French, and
Swedish groups.19
Following Desai et al. (2006b), 38 countries are classified as tax havens and
divided between large and small low-tax jurisdictions (see Table 5). Among
others, the former group includes two OECD countries (Ireland and Switzer-
land) and two Asian tigers (Hong Kong and Singapore). Small tax havens
include differing jurisdictions ranging from Caribbean islands such as the
Bahamas and the Cayman Islands to archipelagos in the Indian Ocean such
as Mauritius and the Seychelles, through to European small countries such
as Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and Malta.20
19The observations are less than 27,120 (see last rows of Table 2) because companies
with only one year of data are dropped in a dynamic model with one lagged dependent
variable. Also, the use of the instrumental variables and their lags reduces the sample.
20Table 5 does not provide an exhaustive list of low-tax jurisdictions. Some tax havens
such as the Maldives, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands are not included. Table
5 includes only the offshore fiscal centres in which the ultimate owners in the sample
own a subsidiary. Interestingly, for US global ultimate owners, the pattern of tax haven
operations is similar to the one in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) who find that US companies
locate their low-tax subsidiaries mainly in Singapore, Switzerland, Ireland, Barbados,
14
In the sample, the most popular low-tax jurisdictions are large countries
such as Switzerland, Singapore, Ireland, and Hong Kong reflecting the wider
opportunities of their larger and more developed economies (see Table 6).
Ultimate owners of all 15 countries are present in the four large low-tax
jurisdictions. More specifically, Switzerland has a prominent role among
continental European countries. It is the most popular low-tax location for
Austrian, German, Danish, Finnish, French, Dutch, and Swedish compa-
nies. Ireland is the favourite destination of UK companies whilst Singapore
is the prevailing choice for US multinationals, followed by Hong Kong and
Ireland. Among small tax havens, the most popular is Luxembourg. It is the
first destination for Belgian GUOs whilst remaining important for Spanish,
Greek (second destination), French, and Swiss companies (third destination).
Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, and Barbados are
also prominent small tax havens. Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and Bar-
bados are strongly dominated by US companies whilst about one fourth of
the subsidiaries in the British Virgin Islands are UK-owned.
The identification strategy of this paper relies on measuring the change in
the consolidated tax bill after tax haven operations have been expanded or
reduced: groups with more extensive offshore operations are expected to have
a lower tax bill. To implement this strategy, the extent of tax haven opera-
tions of each group must be identified. This can be done in ORBIS as it pro-
Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands (see Table 6).
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vides information on the country of residence of the immediate subsidiaries
of the ultimate owner filing the consolidated accounts. Unfortunately, OR-
BIS contains only time-invariant information on the ownership structure.21
To create a time-varying variable recording the number of subsidiaries in
offshore low-tax centres, the dataset is merged with ZEPHYR.22 The latter
contains M&A deals that occurred between 1999 and 2007. By merging the
two datasets, it is possible to create a time-varying ownership structure us-
ing ORBIS ownership information as a starting point. In other words, if a
company in ORBIS appears in ZEPHYR as an acquirer and (or) as a vendor
of a subsidiary located in a tax haven, a time-varying variable recording the
number of subsidiaries in offshore centres can be built. For an example of
how such a variable as been constructed see Table 8.23
Descriptive statistics for the entire sample are shown in Table 9. Ultimate
owners are classified as multinationals if they own foreign subsidiaries (with
more than 50 per cent of their capital). The rest of the companies are classi-
21The information refers to the last available year, mainly 2007.
22ZEPHYR is also produced by Bureau Van Dijk. For a summary of the final dataset
downloading and construction, see tables 2 and 7. For more information on the dataset,
see Table A.11 in Maffini (2007).
23The datasets used have some limitations. First, the variable recording the number of
tax haven subsidiaries is built starting from the static information recorded in ORBIS. This
includes only first-level subsidiaries. If there is relevant information in second and further
levels subsidiaries, the estimates might be biased. Second, the time-varying changes in
the variable are built using ZEPHYR. The latter only records M&A deals. It does not
record whether a new subsidiary has been created. More generally, there might be an
underestimation of their presence in tax havens. Despite the drawbacks of the sample
used here, this is one of the first cross-country datasets constructed with time-varying
information on tax haven operations.
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fied as domestic. For descriptive purposes, multinationals are then classified
further into two groups: those with at least one subsidiary in tax havens
and those without any operations in offshore centres24 (see Table 10). In
the sample, multinationals are evenly split between those with and those
without first-level tax haven subsidiaries. Each of the two groups represents
about 40 per cent of the total GUOs. Most of the individual countries are
characterised by a higher proportion of multinational ultimate owners with-
out offshore first-level subsidiaries, with the exception of Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
Multinationals with operations in tax havens are on average not only the
most profitable but also the least likely to run losses (see tables 10 and 11).
Additionally, their losses are the smallest on average. These factors explain
their higher tax bill (divided by total assets): higher profits lead to higher
tax charges, ceteris paribus. Ultimate owners with subsidiaries in low-tax
jurisdictions are also the largest in terms of number of employees and the
number of total subsidiaries, including non-tax havens subsidiaries.
24See Table 5 for a classification of tax havens.
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4 Empirical Model and Main Empirical Chal-
lenges
The purpose of this paper is to assess how tax haven operations impact on
the tax bill of a corporate group. Tax payments can be affected by various
characteristics of the tax base such as deductions for labour costs and interest
payments. Given these characteristics, a group with tax haven operations
has the ability to reduce its tax bill to a relatively greater extent than can
groups without operations in low-tax jurisdictions. To motivate the empirical
analysis illustrated later in this paper, the consolidated profit of a corporate
group with operations in a tax haven can be described with a stylised model
where a MNC headquartered in country H owns a subsidiary in a low-tax
country F and tH > tF :
Π∗ = piA − tH [piA(1− ξ − s1)− s2K − s3I]+
−tF [s1piA + s2K + s3I]+
−γ1
2
s21 −
γ2
2
s22 −
γ3
2
s23
(1)
piA is accounting profit which is generated only in the home country H; tH
is the statutory corporate tax rate in the home country and tF is the statu-
tory corporate tax rate in a foreign country F. ξ represents the proportion
of accounting profit which does not form part of the taxable profit; K rep-
resents consolidated total assets. The amount of profit shifted to low-tax
jurisdictions can either be proportional to accounting profit (s1) and (or) be
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associated with other characteristics of the firm such as size K (s2) or the
amount of intangible assets I (s3). Two corporate groups with the same prof-
itability may be able to shift different amounts of profits around the world.
In particular, larger firms may have more opportunities to relocate earnings
in one of their many subsidiaries. The same can be said for intangible as-
sets whose role in profit-shifting activities has been widely recognised in the
literature. For US-owned MNCs, Grubert (2003) argues that half of the dif-
ference between their profitability in low-tax and high-tax subsidiaries can be
explained by transfer of intellectual property. The terms γ1
2
s21,
γ2
2
s22, and
γ3
2
s23
represent the cost of profit shifting entailed by the resources needed to set
up tax avoidance schemes and by the legal expenses arising if such schemes
are contested by the tax authorities or by the minority shareholders. Such
costs are assumed not to be tax deductible.
Suppose the only decision variables are the amounts of profit shifted from
H to F. The firm maximises its overall profit by choosing to shift optimal
amounts of profits s∗1, s
∗
2, and s
∗
3 such that:
s∗1 =
(tH − tF )piA
γ1
(2)
s∗2 =
(tH − tF )K
γ2
(3)
s∗3 =
(tH − tF )I
γ3
(4)
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Equations (2), (3), and (4) indicate that the corporate group shifts profits to
the low-tax jurisdiction F insofar as tH > tF .
The data described in Section 3 do not contain information on the flows of
profits between the low-tax subsidiaries and the ultimate owner. Only the
number of tax havens subsidiaries is available. Given the restrictions placed
on this analysis by the data, there are two ways in which the profit-shifting
functions s1, s2, and s3 can be modeled. First, profit shifting to tax havens
can be represented as a function of a dummy recording whether the corporate
group has at least one subsidiary in tax havens.25 Second, profit shifting can
be thought of as a general quadratic function of the number of tax havens
subsidiaries such that:
s1 = δ1n+ δ2n
2 (5)
s2 = φ1n+ φ2n
2 (6)
s1 = λ1n+ λ2n
2 (7)
To empirically investigate the effects of profit shifting into tax havens on the
25Robustness checks on this specification are presented in Section 5 and in Table 13.
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tax liabilities, it is useful to represent the group tax bill as
T = tH [piA(1− ξ − s∗1)− s∗2K − s∗3I]+
+tF [s∗1pi
A + s∗2K + s
∗
3I]
(8)
Substituting (5), (6), and (7) in equation (8) and dividing through by K:
T
K
= φ1(t
F − tH)n+ φ2(tF − tH)n2+
+[tH(1− ξ)]pi
A
K
+
+δ1(t
F − tH)pi
A
K
n+ δ2(t
F − tH)pi
A
K
n2+
+λ1(t
F − tH) I
K
n+ λ2(t
F − tH) I
K
n2
(9)
Equation (9) is estimated as:
Yi,t = α0 + α1ni,t + α2n
2
i,t+
+α3(
piA
K
)i,t + α4(
piA
K
n)i,t + α5(
piA
K
n2)i,t+
+α6(
I
K
n) + α7(
I
K
n2) + fi + i,t
(10)
where
α1 = φ1(t
F − tH); α2 = φ2(tF − tH);
α3 = t
H(1− ξ);
α4 = δ1(t
F − tH); α5 = δ2(tF − tH);
α6 = λ1(t
F − tH); α7 = λ2(tF − tH)
(11)
and i indexes a group filing consolidated accounts, and t denotes a year. Yi,t
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is the tax (430)26 charged to the consolidated P&L account divided by total
assets (412). The tax variable used here reflects book taxes. There might
be discrepancies between the tax charges reported in the financial accounts
and the real taxes paid. In particular, in countries with a worldwide system
of taxation of corporate profits, tax charges can be reported in the financial
accounts because profits will be repatriated and taxes paid on them some-
times in the future. If the tax liabilities charged to the P&L account reflect
only accounting adjustments and not real taxes paid, this research would
not estimate a real effect but only an accounting effect. This is a problem
common to the rest of the literature.27
The literature traditionally employs the ETR (that is, tax bill divided by
profitability) as the dependent variable (for example, Markle and Shackelford
(2009)) where both the numerator and the denominator are positive. The
sample used here contains positive and negative values for both the tax bill
and profitability. Selecting only profitable companies and companies paying
positive taxes might lead to biased results as explained below.28
The extent of tax haven operations is represented by n and it is measured
26The variables codes in ORBIS are given in parenthesis and in bold.
27For more details on the debate about the advantages and disadvantages of using
accounting tax charges, see Markle and Shackelford (2009), footnote 14 and references
therein.
28Using sales instead of profitability as in Desai et al. (2006b) also mitigates the problem.
Unfortunately, the variable net sales is scarcely available in the working sample.
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by the number of subsidiaries located in the low-tax jurisdictions listed in
Table 5. piA symbolises accounting profitability which is measured as P&L
before taxation (429); K represents the capital stock and it is measured by
the book value of total assets (412). I represents intangibles measured by
the book value of intangible fixed assets (405); fi is an unobserved time-
invariant group-specific effect; and εi,t is an idiosyncratic shock likely to be
correlated with the right-hand side variables.
This model allows the group tax payments to change when the extent of
operations in tax havens changes. The coefficient α1 captures the effect of
tax haven operations independently of profitability (direct effect); α1 is ex-
pected to be negative. α2 captures any non-linear relationship between tax
haven operations and the corresponding conditional expectation of Yi,t. In
this model, it is possible to estimate the extent to which the group ETR
drops when more offshore operations become available within a corporate
group. In equation (10), α3 measures the marginal ETR
29 for a group with-
out tax haven operations. α4 and α5 measure the additional effect on the
marginal ETR for a group which switches from zero to one subsidiary in tax
havens; α4 is expected to be negative, as the marginal ETR should decline
when tax haven operations are available; α5 captures the non-linear effects
of tax haven operations on the marginal ETR.
29In fact, α3 =
∂( tax billtot. assets )
∂( P&Ltot.assets )
= ∂(tax bill)∂(P&L) for a group without tax haven operations. A
similar approach is used in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009).
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For companies with tax haven operations, the marginal ETR is given by
(α3 + α4n + α5n
2). Thus, as shown in (11), the marginal ETR depends on
the corporate statutory tax rates tF of the countries where profits have been
shifted. Empirically, the marginal ETR will be determined not only by the
corporate statutory tax rates of tax havens but also by the statutory tax
rates of other countries where real profits are located or where profits have
been shifted. The data used here do not contain information on the location
of all subsidiaries of a corporate group. This implies there is no information
on all the relevant foreign corporate tax rates. When comparing marginal
ETR across different companies, it is therefore not possible to control for
the different foreign tax rates relevant for calculating the overall group tax
burden.
Intangible assets such as patents are often used to transfer profits from high-
to low-tax jurisdictions: they can be moved easily and arm’s length prices
are difficult to establish for them. Since a higher concentration of intangibles
creates more opportunities for transfer-pricing, α6 is expected to be negative.
α7, like α5 captures non-linear effects of low-tax operations.
In the setting analysed here, there are three econometric issues that need
to be addressed. The first one is related to the possible endogeneity of tax
haven operations. The choice of setting up operations in low-tax jurisdictions
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might be determined by the profit and hence by the tax bill itself. Table 11
shows that groups without tax haven operations are more likely to report
losses, and their losses are larger than those of groups present in tax havens.
Unprofitable companies have less profits to shift and therefore they will gain
less from tax haven operations, as they are already able to reduce their tax
bill through the loss carryforward provisions. This result is important. It
shows that the selection of only profitable companies can bias the estimations
towards finding a negative effect of tax haven subsidiaries on tax liabilities as
profitable firms have a greater incentive to locate part of their operations in
offshore low-tax jurisdictions. Two key implications can be drawn from Table
11. First, unprofitable entities and unprofitable years have to be included in
the sample. Second, the presence in tax havens is likely to be determined
endogenously by previous tax positions. This is connected with the second
econometric issue. This second issue stems from the likely presence of un-
observable group fixed effects and unobservable time-variant shocks which
simultaneously affect the tax bill and the decision to locate activities in tax
havens. The third issue concerns regressors other than the number of tax
haven subsidiaries. Important determinants of the tax bill such as profitabil-
ity and intangibles intensity could be determined simultaneously with the tax
bill. This paper tackles the first issue by including unprofitable entities and
years in which a group reports an aggregate loss. It deals with the last two
issues by first constructing a time-variant indicator for tax haven operations
and then by using the difference generalised method of moments (GMM-diff)
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estimator described in Arellano and Bond (1991).
5 Main results
Table 12 presents results for the basic specification of equation (10) where the
dependent variable is the ratio of consolidated tax charges to the consolidated
book value of total assets. Presence in low-tax jurisdictions is measured by
the number of first-level subsidiaries in tax havens. All specifications include
a lagged dependent variable which controls for slow adjustments in the tax
bill. Tax liabilities might depend on previous tax payments for many rea-
sons. For example, a company might arise the suspicion of tax authorities
if it shifts an amount of ernings that is too high with respect to previous
years. All specifications also include country-year dummies which control for
factors in the country of the GUO likely to affect tax liabilities. Examples
of such factors are the statutory corporate income tax rate, the extent of
deductions from the tax base, the effectiveness of the anti-avoidance legisla-
tion, the effectiveness of tax authorities in detecting tax avoidance and tax
evasion, and the economic cycle.
Column 1 of Table 12 shows the results from a pooled OLS regression. In this
context, the estimator does not control for group-specific effects, nor does it
deal with the likely correlation of the regressors with the error term. The
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within-group estimator in column 2 controls for group fixed effects, but it
does not deal with the bias arising from the correlation between the regres-
sors and the error term. Blundell et al. (2000) showed that the pooled OLS
estimator of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is upward-biased,
whilst the within-group estimator is downward-biased. Hence, columns 1 and
2 are useful for setting an upper and a lower bound to the estimates of the
lagged dependent variable shown in columns 3 to 5 and obtained using a
GMM-diff estimator.
As explained above, the GMM-diff controls for unobservable group fixed ef-
fects, and at the same time it deals with the likely correlation of unobservable
shocks with the first-difference of the lagged dependent variable and of other
regressors. The set of instruments used in the GMM-diff of columns 3 to 5
includes the first and second lag of the previous two periods’ average tax bill
divided by total assets.30 The average tax bill in the two previous periods is
likely to be a good predictor of whether the company decides to expand its
tax haven operations or not. A group with a low-tax bill will be less willing
to incur the costs of expanding its operations in low-tax jurisdictions, ceteris
paribus. As standard in Arellano and Bond (1991), other instruments em-
ployed are the second and further lags of the number of subsidiaries in tax
30The average value of the tax bill divided by total assets for the previous two periods
is calculated as follows:
(
tax billt−1
tot.assetst−1 )+(
tax billt−2
tot.assetst−2 )
2 . The instruments used are therefore
(
tax billt−2
tot.assetst−2 )+(
tax billt−3
tot.assetst−3 )
2 and
(
tax billt−3
tot.assetst−3 )+(
tax billt−4
tot.assetst−4 )
2 .
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havens, of profitability, intangible intensity, size, and of their interactions
with the number of subsidiaries in tax havens. Country-year dummies are
also included in the instrument set. Instruments are collapsed as described
in Roodman (2009) to contain their proliferation. In the specifications of
columns 3 to 5, the test for over-identification and the tests for first and
second order serial correlation are satisfactory. The null hypothesis of first
order serial correlation is rejected and the null hypothesis of second order se-
rial correlation is not rejected. Under the Sargan-Hansen test, the joint null
hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and
that they are correctly excluded from the estimated equation is not rejected.
The estimates of Table 12 are consistent with the model presented in Sec-
tion 4. In columns 3 to 5, the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable lies between the pooled OLS value of column 1 and its within-group
equivalent displayed in column 2. More specifically, the estimated coefficient
of the lagged dependent variable varies between 0.068 and 0.071.
Column 3 reports results for the model displayed in equation (10). The di-
rect effect of the number of tax haven subsidiaries on the tax bill over total
assets is not significant; it remains so across all specifications in Table 12.
The marginal ETR estimated by the coefficient of profitability α3 is highly
statistically significant. It remains so across all specifications in Table 12.
Its magnitude is estimated to be around 34 per cent. This means that for
companies without tax haven operations, a one US dollar increase in the
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consolidated accounting profit leads to about a 34 cents increase in the con-
solidated tax liabilities. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction term
between profitability and the number of tax haven subsidiaries α4 is negative
but not significant.
As discussed in Section 4, it is important to control for losses, as companies
with negative earnings might have less incentive to expand in tax havens.
The coefficient of the dummy indicating an aggregate loss is positive and
significant. This might seem counter-intuitive. However it is possible that
an ultimate owner has a positive tax bill even when it reports losses in the
consolidated accounts. In fact some of its subsidiaries might be profitable
and therefore might be paying taxes, even if total group losses are larger
than the profits of those subsidiaries. The presence of a consolidated loss
interacted with tax haven subsidiaries reduces the tax bill, as shown by the
negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between
the dummy for losses and the number of subsidiaries in tax havens.
It is known that larger firms tend to have more intangibles. It is therefore
useful to control for both intangibles and size31 in the same regression, as
shown in column 4. The coefficient of intangible intensity is not statistically
significant at conventional levels. However, the coefficient of the interaction
between intangible intensity and the number of subsidiaries in tax havens
31Size is measured by the logarithm of the number of employees (425).
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is negative and significant. This indicates that intangibles per se might not
influence the tax bill, but it is their role in conjunction with tax havens that
really reduces tax charges. The effect of size on the tax bill seems more com-
plex to analyse. The significant and positive coefficient of the interaction
between the logarithm of employment and the presence in tax havens points
to a slightly higher tax over total assets for larger entities with operations in
tax havens.
Column 4 of Table 12 shows that the marginal ETR is around 33 per cent
and highly significant across different specifications. It also indicates that
there is a negative and statistically significant effect of low-tax operations
on the marginal ETR as α4 is negative and statistically significant. The
coefficient α5 is instead not significant. Considering a corporate group with
two tax haven subsidiaries,32 the coefficient estimates imply that its marginal
ETR will be 0.4 percentage points lower than the marginal ETR of compa-
nies without tax haven subsidiaries, ceteris paribus. Considering the mean
number of subsidiaries in tax havens for the group of companies with at least
one offshore subsidiary (five), the marginal ETR will be about one percentage
points lower (that is, at about 32 per cent) than the marginal ETR of compa-
nies without tax haven operations. As explained above, the coefficient of the
dummy recording whether the corporate group reports a consolidated loss is
32The sample mean value of the variable number of subsidiaries in tax havens is 2. For
more details see Table 9.
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positive and statistically significant. This positive effect is however reduced
by the use of tax haven operations as indicated by the negative and sta-
tistically significant value of the coefficient on the interaction term between
the indicator for losses and the number of subsidiaries in tax havens. This
provides evidence that the combined presence of aggregate losses and oper-
ations in low-tax jurisdictions reduces the tax burden of the corporate group.
The specification in column 5 controls for the size of losses. The coefficient of
the value of losses is not significant. The same can be said for the coefficients
of the interaction between the value of losses and the number of tax haven
subsidiaries and its squared value. The other coefficients confirm the results
in column 4. α4 is negative and statistically significant pointing to a reduc-
tion of the marginal ETR through tax haven operations. Low-tax offshore
operations also reduce the tax liabilities through the use of intangibles (see
the negative and significant coefficient of the interaction between tax haven
subsidiaries and intangible assets) and losses. The number of operations in
tax havens do not seem to have a non-linear relationship with the tax bill
and with the marginal ETR. The coefficient of the variables interacted with
the squared value of the number of tax haven subsidiaries is never significant,
except than in the case of size proxied by the logarithm of the number of
employees.
In a polynomial model with interaction terms, coefficients are not directly
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interpretable as the effect of their associated covariates depends on the value
of the covariate itself and on the value of the other regressors. To quantify
the overall effect of an additional tax haven subsidiary, it is useful to write:
∂y
∂n
= α1 + 2α2n+ α4
piA
K
+ 2α5
piA
K
n+
+α6
I
K
+ 2α7
I
K
n+
+α8dloss + 2α9dlossn+
+α10log(employees) + 2α11log(employees)n
(12)
It is possible to calculate the value of equation (12) for each observation of
the sample by multiplying the value of the estimated coefficients by the rel-
evant variables. In this way, it is possible to obtain a sample mean value for
the derivative in equation (12). The sample mean value for the derivative is
-0.0013, which applied to the sample mean value of the dependent variable
(0.019) indicates that an additional tax haven subsidiary reduces the tax li-
abilities over total assets by about 7 per cent. The long-run effect is very
similar, at about 7.4 per cent.33
Table 13 introduces a slightly different model by employing dummy indica-
tors for tax haven activity. Each specification of Table 13 includes a dummy
d1 which records whether the corporate group owns at least one low-tax
33The calculations of the long-run effect are as follows: −0.0013(1−0.0703) = −0.0014 and
−0.0014
0.019 = −0.074
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offshore subsidiary. To capture additional effects of a large number of tax
haven subsidiaries, dummies registering whether the group has two or more,
three or more, four or more, and 30 or more34 offshore subsidiaries are em-
ployed in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Dummies vary very little in
the sample. Table 14 shows that only a few companies switch from owning
zero to owning some tax haven subsidiaries. The variation is even smaller
for the dummies recording whether the corporate group has more than 2, 3,
4, or 30 low-tax offshore subsidiaries. With so little variation the dummies
are unlikely to pick up the effects being studied here. Contrary to the num-
ber of subsidiaries in Table 12, in columns 1 to 3 of Table 13 the dummy
d1 identifies a negative and statistically significant direct effect on total tax
liabilities divided by total assets. Column 4 instead identifies only the effect
of tax havens on the marginal ETR. The estimated coefficient of the dum-
mies recording more than two, three, four, or 30 tax haven subsidiaries are
never statistically significant. The same can be said for the estimated coef-
ficients of the variables interacted with those dummies. This is probably a
consequence of the little within-group variation of the dummies. Most of the
ultimate owners enter and exit the sample with either some or no tax haven
subsidiaries whilst many groups frequently vary the number of offshore oper-
ations. Therefore, dummies may not be able to pick up adequately the effect
this paper attempts to analyse. The number of subsidiaries in tax havens
employed in Table 12 seems therefore a more suitable measure for corporate
34The top percentile for the variable ‘number of subsidiaries in tax havens’ is 30.
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groups’ activity in low-tax jurisdictions.
The findings of the model measuring offshore activities with the number of
subsidiaries in tax havens are robust to various changes in the sample, as
shown in Table 15. For ease of comparison, column 1 of Table 15 reports the
preferred specification initially introduced in column 4 of Table 12. About
3 per cent of the ultimate owners in the sample are resident in Ireland or
Switzerland, two countries considered as tax havens for the purpose of this
research. Groups headquartered in low-tax jurisdictions may profit less from
tax haven operations, as they already enjoy mild taxation in the home coun-
try. The results of the preferred specification are robust to the exclusion of
GUOs located in Ireland or Switzerland, as displayed in column 2 of Table
15. Column 3 shows that when excluding companies classified as domes-
tic entities at least once between 2003 and 2007, the results remain very
close in magnitude to those of column 1. As for corporations headquartered
in low-tax jurisdictions, companies reporting losses are likely to profit less
from tax haven operations. However, results are also robust to the exclusion
of companies always reporting aggregate losses between 2003 and 2007, as
shown in column 4. The same can be said of a set of companies with a to-
tal number of tax haven subsidiaries smaller than 30 (column 5 of Table 15).35
All countries in the sample exempt foreign profits with the exception of Ire-
35The top percentile for the variable ‘number of subsidiaries in tax havens’ is 30.
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land, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The United Kingdom
shifted to a territorial system in 2009 and the new rules will apply from
the fiscal year 2009–2010. The change in the taxation of foreign profits has
spurred a debate on whether the new system will be more vulnerable to tax
avoidance. In a territorial system, there is an incentive for a corporate group
to both locate the real activities and shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions as
foreign profits from low-tax jurisdictions bear no taxation at home even if
they are repatriated. In a worldwide taxation system, foreign profits enjoy
mild or zero taxation only insofar as they are not repatriated. In theory,
tax haven operations are more effective in reducing the overall tax burden
for multinationals headquartered in countries with a territorial system, al-
though this does not hold in practice if multinationals rarely repatriate their
profits to a home jurisdiction with a worldwide system. The question be-
comes an empirical one. Table 16 investigates this issue in two ways. First,
it investigates whether tax haven operations are more effective at reducing
the tax burden of corporate groups headquartered in exemption countries,
rather than of groups resident in jurisdictions with a worldwide taxation sys-
tem. Second, it evaluates whether the marginal ETR of the former set of
countries is statistically different from the marginal ETR of the latter group,
at conventional significance levels.
The specification in column 1 of Table 16 is obtained by interacting the vari-
ables of the preferred specification (column 4 of Table 12) with a dummy dCR
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which takes the value one when the GUO is resident in a jurisdiction which
applies a worldwide system for the taxation of corporate profits. Some inter-
acted variables are then dropped if their estimated coefficient is not statisti-
cally significant at conventional levels in all specifications presented in Table
16. This should reduce multicollinearity problems and shrink the number
of instruments. For all companies, the specification is able to identify both
a negative and statistically significant direct effect of tax haven operations
on the tax bill (α1) and a negative statistically significant effect of low-tax
activities on the marginal ETR (α4). In column 1 the effect of offshore op-
erations on tax liabilities does not differ statistically between territorial and
worldwide systems of corporate income taxation. None of the coefficients of
the variables recording the number of tax haven subsidiaries interacted with
the credit dummy dCR is significant, except for those interacted with the
dummy recording an aggregate loss.
Column 2 excludes companies classified at least once as domestic. When only
MNCs are considered, the effect of tax haven subsidiaries on the marginal
ETR is larger for companies headquartered in countries with an exemption
system than for companies headquartered in a credit country. The effect for
the former group of companies is given by the coefficient of the variable inter-
acting profitability with the number of tax haven subsidiaries (0.8 percentage
points). The effect for the latter set of firms is 0.1 percentage points (0.008 -
0.007). The differential effect of tax haven operations between territorial and
credit countries is also robust to the specifications of the last two columns of
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Table 16. Column 4 excludes GUOs headquartered in Ireland and Switzer-
land whilst column 5 drops GUOs reporting only losses between 2003 and
2007. The direct effect of low-tax offshore operations on the tax bill (α1)
and the effect on the marginal ETR (α4) are robust to the specifications of
columns 3 to 6.
A crucial result for the comparison of territorial and worldwide systems of
taxation is that the marginal ETR is substantially lower for corporate groups
headquartered in jurisdictions which exempt foreign profits. Depending on
the sample considered, the group marginal ETR of companies with a GUO
resident in an exemption country is between 13 and 14 percentage points
lower than the marginal ETR of groups headquartered in credit countries.
This is shown by the coefficient of the profitability variable multiplied by the
dummy for credit countries. The difference is statistically significant at 1
per cent. Corporate groups headquartered in countries which exempt foreign
profits may be able to reduce their overall tax liabilities by locating their
real activities and by shifting profits into jurisdictions that can guarantee
a lower fiscal burden without being tax havens. The difference between the
marginal ETR of the two groups cannot be entirely attributed to the different
ways in which the territorial and the worldwide systems tax foreign profits
and therefore to the amount of tax avoidance activity in the two systems.
The marginal ETR of each company is influenced by many characteristics of
the tax system of each country where the corporate group has some oper-
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ations. These characteristics include the statutory corporate tax rates and
the deductions allowed on the tax base. Also, for credit countries, the taxes
reported in the P&L accounts could be higher than those really paid. In
fact, taxes could be reported in the financial accounts in anticipation of prof-
its repatriation in future accounting periods. Because of constraints in the
data, this study is unable to control for these characteristics.
Columns 5 and 6 investigate the difference in marginal ETRs further. By in-
teracting country dummies with the profitability for the three credit countries
(Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the last two columns
of Table 16 explain in more details the determinants of such difference. The
corporate groups headquartered in the United States are characterised by the
highest marginal ETR which is between 13 and 15 percentage points higher
than the mean marginal ETR of groups headquartered in exemption coun-
tries. Companies headquartered in the United Kingdom have a marginal
ETR of about 29 per cent, 7.7 percentage points higher than companies
headquartered in exemption countries. The difference in marginal ETRs be-
tween US- and UK-owned groups might reflect a tougher stance taken by the
United States on profit shifting for example through the implementation of
passive income rules and interest allocation rules. Irish companies display
an overall marginal ETR lower than that of groups headquartered in exemp-
tion countries. This is expected as Ireland has the lowest corporate tax rate
among OECD countries (12.5 per cent). These results do not describe the
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tax revenues of an individual country or of a group of countries. They instead
describe the overall tax burden of corporate groups headquartered in a spe-
cific jurisdiction or in a specific set of jurisdictions. They are consistent with
the idea that the territorial system is more flexible in allowing corporations
to minimise their tax burden by choosing where to locate real activities and
profits.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the effect of tax haven operations on tax liabilities
of multinational groups headquartered in 15 OECD countries: Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Using consolidated accounting data from ORBIS (2003–2007)
and ownership changes constructed by merging ZEPHYR with ORBIS, this
paper finds that, at the mean, an additional tax haven subsidiary reduces tax
liabilities over total assets by about 7 per cent in the short run and 7.4 per
cent in the long run. More specifically, at the mean, the marginal ETR of
a corporate group with tax haven subsidiaries is about one percentage point
lower than groups without low-tax offshore operations. The results are likely
to underestimate the effect of offshore low-tax operations on the tax bill, as
the number of subsidiaries in tax havens may not pick up the entire extent
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of profit shifting into low-tax jurisdictions.
This paper also investigates whether a territorial system for the taxation of
corporate profits entails a lower consolidated tax burden than a worldwide
taxation system. The results show some evidence consistent with tax haven
operations reducing tax liabilities more in territorial systems. Multinational
companies headquartered in exemption countries reduce their marginal ETR
more from low-tax offshore operations than do corporate groups headquar-
tered in a credit country. The results also indicate that the marginal ETR
of the first set of companies is lower than the marginal ETR of corporate
groups headquartered in jurisdictions which do not exempt foreign profits.
More specifically, companies headquartered in the United States are charac-
terised by the highest marginal ETR. Cross-country variations in statutory
corporate tax rates, in the way the tax base is calculated, and in the way
future tax liabilities are recorded into the accounts can only partially explain
such a divergence.
The results on the marginal ETRs presented in this paper do not describe
the tax revenues of countries with a territorial or a worldwide system. They
instead describe the overall tax burden of corporate groups headquartered in
countries with either one or the other system of taxation of corporate profits.
The findings are consistent with the territorial system being more flexible
in allowing corporations to minimise their tax burden by choosing where to
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locate real activities and profits.
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Table 1: Corporate Groups by Sector
Sector No. of corporate groups Per cent
Mining and quarrying 110 3.25
Manufacturing of food products and beverages 92 2.71
Manufacturing of tobacco products 5 0.15
Manufacturing of textiles 22 0.65
Manufacturing of wearing apparel 28 0.83
Manufacturing of leather products 11 0.32
Manufacturing of wood 10 0.30
Manufacturing of paper 36 1.06
Publishing and printing 54 1.59
Manufacturing of coke, petroleum, and nuclear fuel 14 0.41
Manufacturing of chemicals 220 6.49
Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products 46 1.36
Manufacturing of other non-metallic products 31 0.91
Manufacturing of basic metals 51 1.50
Manufacturing of fabricated metal prods 46 1.36
v machinery and equipment 172 5.08
Manufacturing of office machinery and computers 65 1.92
Manufacturing of electrical machinery 61 1.80
Manufacturing of radio, TVs, and communication equipment 280 8.26
Manufacturing of medical, precision, and optical instruments 192 5.67
Manufacturing of transport equipment 99 2.92
Manufacturing of various 68 2.01
Electricity, gas and water supply 83 2.45
Construction 76 2.24
Wholesale and retail trade 307 9.06
Hotels and restaurants 73 2.15
Transport 97 2.86
Post and telecommunication 130 3.84
Financial intermediation 102 3.01
Real estate activities 43 1.27
Renting of machinery and equipment 22 0.65
Computer and related activities 348 10.27
Research and development 35 1.03
Other business activities 244 7.20
Recreational, cultural, and sport activities 116 3.42
Total 3,389 100.00
(i) Sectors correspond to the two-digit NACE codes (Rev. 1.1).
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Table 2: Construction of the Dataset used in the Empirical Analysis
No. of companies No. observations
ORBIS (online version 16/10/2008)
Selecting on large and very large companies 1,093,428
Exclude companies with no financial information 739,989
Region: Western Europe (26), Canada, and the United States 427,331
Industrial companies only 401,944
Number of employees available non missing 293,906
Only Global Ultimate Owners 26,193
Active companies only 25,201
Firms with consolidated accounts only 17,876
Total assets available for last year 17,863
Companies with majority owned subsidiaries(i) 17,816
Real download from online version(ii) 15,207 136,863
Drop if accounting period different from 12 months 15,207 134,360
Drop if total assets negative or zero 15,207 134,257
Drop non-suitable sectors 14,592 128,833
Drop countries with less than 300 observations 14,555 128,503
Drop if incorporation year is missing 13,918 122,842
Drop outliers(iii) 13,710 117,495
Drop if total assets, P&L before tax, or tax bill missing 13,089 76,445
Drop if information on ownership structure missing 12,959 75,930
MERGE WITH ZEPHYR ACQUIRERS 12,959 75,930
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers) 295 348
MERGE WITH ZEPHYR VENDORS 12,959 75,930
- of which present in ZEPHYR (vendors) 190 271
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers and (or) vendors) 437 606
Drop if number of subs in tax havens is negative 12,908 75,532
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers and (or) vendors) also 386 541
Drop if number of employees missing 5,161 35,288
Drop if (intangibles/total assets) missing 4,618 28,882
Drop if (debt/total assets) missing 4,618 28,882
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers and (or) vendors) also 335 471
Drop if observations not contiguous in the time for same company 4,618 27,120
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers and (or) vendors) also 323 452
(i) Subsidiaries are of the following type: industrial, insurance, banks, or financial institutions.
(ii) The number of companies obtainable through the real download is slightly smaller than the number of
companies potentially available from the online version of ORBIS. This happens because the some obser-
vations are dropped during the download as they miss all the variables, including the company name and
identification number. (iii) Outliers are defined as the observations with a value of P&L before taxation
total assets
,
Tax bill
P&L before taxation
, Fixed assets
no. employees
, or age within the top or bottom 1 per cent. The observations dropped
are 4.35 per cent of the sample.
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Table 3: Distribution of Observations Across Years
Year Frequency Percent
2003 2,115 16.43
2004 2,387 18.54
2005 2,610 20.27
2006 2,813 21.85
2007 2,951 22.92
Total 12,876 100.00
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Table 4: Country Distribution by Type of Group
MNCs MNCs Domestic Total
with TH subs without TH subs groups (%)
Austria 15 [63] 9 [37] 0 24 (0.71)
Belgium 15 [68] 6 [27] 1 [5] 22 (0.65)
Denmark 15 [44] 18 [53] 1 [3] 34 (1.00)
Finland 21 [34] 36 [59] 4 [7] 61 (1.80)
France 112 [56] 68 [34] 20 [10] 200 (5.89)
Germany 105 [50] 83 [40] 22 [10] 210 (6.18)
Greece 8 [32] 16 [64] 1 [4] 25 (0.74)
Ireland 9 [29] 20 [65] 2 [6] 31 (0.91)
Netherlands 34 [69] 12 [24] 3 [6] 49 (1.44)
Norway 10 [26] 28 [72] 1 [3] 39 (1.15)
Spain 20 [44] 24 [53] 1 [2] 45 (1.33)
Sweden 36 [42] 45 [53] 4 [5] 85 (2.51)
Switzerland 42 [70] 16 [27] 2 [3] 60 (1.77)
United Kingdom 242 [38] 255 [40] 142 [22] 639 (18.86)
United States 635 [34] 710 [38] 520 [28] 1,865 (55.03)
Total 1,319 (38.92) 1,346 (39.72) 724 (21.36) 3,389 (100)
(i) Figures indicate the number of ultimate owners. (ii) In parenthesis, percentage
of ultimate owners over the total sample. (iii) In brackets, percentage over the total
number of ultimate owners within a single country.
51
Table 5: Classification of Tax Havens in the Sample
Small tax havens Large tax havens
Andorra (AD) Hong Kong (HK)
Anguilla (AI) Ireland (IE)
Antigua and Barbuda (AG) Lebanon (LB)
Aruba (AW) Liberia (LR)
Bahamas (BS) Panama (PA)
Bahrain (BH) Singapore (SG)
Barbados (BB) Switzerland (CH)
Belize (BZ)
Bermuda (BM)
Cayman Islands (KY)
Cyprus (CY)
Dominica (DM)
Gibraltar (GI)
Grenada (GD)
Iceland (IS)
Jordan (JO)
Liechtenstein (LI)
Luxembourg (LU)
Macau (MO)
Mauritius (MU)
Malta (MT)
Marshall Islands (MH)
Monaco (MC)
Netherlands Antilles (AN)
Saint Kitts and Nevis (KN)
Saint Lucia (LC)
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (VC)
Samoa (WS)
Seychelles (SC)
Vanuatu (VU)
Virgin Islands (British) (VG)
(i) Table 5 does not provide an exhaustive list of low-tax ju-
risdictions. Some tax havens such as the Maldives, the Isle
of Man, and the Channel Islands are not included. Table 5
includes only the offshore fiscal centres in which the ultimate
owners in the working sample own a subsidiary.
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Table 6: Subsidiaries in Each Tax Haven, by Country of GUO
Country of Ultimate Owners
Tax AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GR IE NL NO SE UK US Total
havens
AD 2 (67) 1 (33) 3 [0.10]
AG 1 (33) 1 (33) 1 (33) 3 [0.13]
AI 2 (100) 2 [0.07]
AN 2 (5) 5 (11) 1 (2) 2 (5) 6 (14) 1 (2) 2 (5) 25 (57) 44 [1.56]
AW 1 (17) 2 (33) 1 (17) 2 (33) 6 [0.20]
BB 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (3) 5 (6) 68 (87) 78 [2.69]
BH 1 (6) 2 (12) 1 (6) 2 (12) 6 (35) 5 (29) 17 [0.63]
BM 7 (4) 1 (0.6) 3 (2) 1 (0.6) 2 (1) 1 (0.6) 2 (1) 15 (9) 128 (80) 160 [5.64]
BS 1 (3) 1 (3) 2 (6) 3 (9) 1 (3) 3 (9) 22 (67) 33 [1.19]
BZ 1 (100) 1 [0.07]
CH 11 (2) 3 (0.5) 58 (11) 79 (15) 11 (2) 3 (0.5) 11 (2) 57 (11) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.2) 17 (3) 1 (0.2) 20 (4) 56 (10) 211 (39) 540 [12.74]
CY 3 (5) 1 (2) 4 (7) 1 (2) 4 (7) 8 (13) 2 (3) 3 (5) 1 (2) 7 (12) 26 (43) 60 [2.36]
DM 1 (33) 2 (67) 3 [0.10]
GD 1 (100) 1 [0.03]
GI 1 (4) 1 (4) 1 (4) 4 (17) 16 (70) 23 [0.83]
HK 1 (0.2) 3 (1) 21 (6) 21 (6) 4 (1) 1 (0.2) 5 (1) 31 (8) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.2) 2 (0.5) 1 (0.2) 9 (2) 69 (19) 198 (54) 368 [13.47]
IE 1 (0.2) 4 (1) 10 (2) 13 (3) 1 (0.2) 7 (2) 5 (1) 21 (5) 1 (0.2) 28 (7) 15 (4) 1 (0.2) 11 (3) 113 (27) 181 (44) 412 [15.13]
IS 1 (9) 2 (18) 2 (18) 1 (9) 5 (45) 11 [0.36]
JO 1 (6) 3 (19) 2 (12) 2 (12) 3 (19) 5 (31) 16 [0.53]
KN 1 (100) 1 [0.03]
KY 1 (1) 5 (3) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 5 (3) 1 (1) 17 (11) 117 (79) 149 [1.76]
LB 3 (15) 1 (5) 1 (5) 8 (45) 6 (30) 20 [0.76]
LC 2 (33) 2 (33) 2 (33) 6 [0.20]
LI 1 (6) 4 (25) 2 (12) 1 (6) 1 (6) 3 (19) 4 (25) 16 [0.56]
LR 1 (9) 1 (9) 9 (81) 11 [0.50]
LU 1 (0.3) 9 (3) 11 (4) 19 (7) 1 (0.3) 6 (2) 3 (1) 38 (15) 2 (0.8) 1 (0.3) 8 (3) 7 (3) 47 (18) 108 (41) 261 [9.59]
MC 1 (10) 5 (50) 2 (20) 2 (20) 10 [0.40]
MH 1 (20) 4 (80) 5 [0.23]
MO 1 (10) 1 (10) 2 (20) 6 (60) 10 [0.33]
MT 3 (10) 2 (6) 8 (28) 2 (7) 1 (3) 1 (3) 7 (24) 5 (17) 29 [1.19]
MU 1 (1) 3 (4) 4 (5) 1 (1) 10 (13) 3 (4) 54 (71) 76 [2.75]
PA 7 (11) 4 (7) 4 (7) 5 (8) 3 (5) 1 (2) 6 (10) 31 (51) 61 [2.32]
SC 1 (33) 1 (33) 1 (33) 3 [0.13]
SG 2 (0.4) 3 (0.6) 27 (5) 31 (6) 6 (1) 1 (0.2) 4 (1) 46 (9) 1 (0.2) 2 (0.4) 12 (2) 6 (1) 10 (2) 69 (14) 276 (56) 496 [17.55]
VC 1 (50) 1 (50) 2 [0.07]
VG 1 (1) 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (2) 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1) 19 (23) 48 (59) 82 [3.52]
VU 4 (100) 4 [0.13]
WS 1 (50) 1 (50) 2 [0.10]
Total 27 (1) 25 (1) 173 (6) 204 (7) 29 (1) 28 (1) 31 (1) 248 (8) 17 (0.5) 38 (1.2) 84 (3) 12 (0.4) 66 (2) 468 (15) 1,577 (52) 3,026 [100]
(i) Figures are taken from the 2007 ORBIS static ownership structure. (ii) In parentheses per cent of country of ultimate owner (columns) for
each specific tax haven (rows). (iii) In brackets per cent of subsidiaries in each tax haven over total number of tax haven subsidiaries.
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Table 7: Download of ZEPHYR
ZEPHYR ACQUIRERS (online version 06/01/2009) No. firms No. obs No. deals
(acquirers)
Acquirer located in OECD country 379,323
Target located in tax haven 11,348
Deal type: merger or acquisition 6,634
Deal completed from 1999 onwards 4,295
Real downloadi 3,963 4,762 4,256
Drop if acquirer’s ID missing 2,405 3,204 3,142
Drop if country of target missing 2,362 3,143 3,138
Keep if final stake is majority 1,792 2,248 2,244
Drop if year of deal 2008 or missing 1,579 1,957 1,957
Drop if acquirer’s country not relevant 1,523 1,886 1,957
Drop if country of target not tax haven 1,491 1,841 1,886
Create a panel with only one observation for each year and each company 1,491 1,701
ZEPHYR VENDORS (online version 06/01/2009) No. firms No. obs No. deals
(vendors)
Vendor located in OECD country 140,425
Target located in tax haven 5,166
Deal completed from 1999 onwards 3,252
Real downloadi 3,224 4,097 3,223
Drop if aquirer’s ID missing 1,528 2,401 2,086
Drop if country of target missing 1,392 2,189 2,084
Drop if year of deal 2008 or missing 1,257 1,822 1,822
Drop if country of target not tax haven 1,220 1,773 1,773
Create a panel with only one observation for each year and each company 1,220 1,528
(i) The number of deals obtainable through the real download is slightly smaller than the number of deals poten-
tially available from the online version of ZEPHYR. This happens because some observations are dropped during
the download as they miss all the variables, including the company name and identification number.
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Table 8: Construction of ‘Number of Tax Havens Subsidiaries’ –Example
Year Static ownership structure ZEPHYR ZEPHYR No. subsidiaries
from ORBIS (vendors) (acquirers) in tax havens
BB BM CH HK IE KY LC LU MO PA VC BH HK SG CH MC
1999 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 18
2000 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 17
2001 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 15
2002 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 15
2003 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 14
2004 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 15
2005 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 15
2006 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 15
2007 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 14
(i) Barbados (BB), Bermuda (BM), Switzerland (CH), Hong Kong (HK), Ireland(IE), Cayman Islands (KY),
Saint Lucia (LC), Luxembourg (LU), Macau (MO), Panama (PA), Saint Vincent (VC), Singapore (SG),
Monaco (MC). (ii) Figures represent the number of subsidiaries located in each tax haven. In the section
‘ZEPHYR (vendors)’ the figures represent the number of subsidiaries sold by the ultimate owner in that spe-
cific year. In the section ‘ZEPHYR (acquirers)’ the figures represent the number of subsidiaries acquired by
the ultimate owner in that specific year. (iii) The value of the variable recording the number of subsidiaries
located in tax havens for 2007 is created by adding up the static information from ORBIS (column 2 to
12). The value of such a variable for the previous year (2006) is created by adding up the information from
ZEPHYR vendors (column 13 to 16, row 2007) and by subtracting the information from ZEPHYR acquirers
(column 17, row 2007). The process continues backwards until the last year (here 1999).
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Tax bill/total assets .019 .026 -.190 .222
Number of subsidiaries in tax havens 2 6.134 0 192
Dummy - at least one tax haven subsidiary .409 .492 0 1
Dummy - more than two tax haven subsidiaries .184 .388 0 1
Dummy - more than three tax haven subsidiaries .184 .388 0 1
Dummy - more than four tax haven subsidiaries .184 .388 0 1
Dummy - more than 30 tax haven subsidiaries .184 .388 0 1
P&L before tax/total assets (if gain) .070 .070 0 .521
P&L before tax/total assets (if loss) -.056 .227 -6.964 0
Dummy - aggregate loss
Intangibles/total assets .203 .190 0 .975
Log(employees) 7.390 2.175 0 14.557
(i) Intangibles include goodwill (ii) The total number of ultimate owners is 3,389 and to-
tal number of observations is 12,876.
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics by Type of Group
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
MNCs with Subsidiaries in Tax Havens
Tax bill/total assets 5,407 .022 .025 -.190 .222
Number of total subsidiaries 76 137.29 1 2,288
Number of subs in tax havens 5 8.684 0 192
Dummy - any subs in tax havens .974 .161 0 1
Dummy - less than 2 subs in tax havens .534 .490 0 1
Dummy - more than 2 subs in tax havens .439 .496 0 1
P&L before tax/total assets (if gain) .077 .070 0 .421
P&L before tax/total assets (if loss) -.021 .102 -2.434 0
Dummy - aggregate loss .165 .371 0 1
Intangibles/total assets .207 .174 0 .934
Log(number of employees) 8.406 1.987 0 14.557
MNCs without Subsidiaries in Tax Havens
Tax bill/total assets 5,045 .019 .027 -.113 .159
Number total subsidiaries 23 59.13 1 1,398
P&L before tax/total assets (if gain) .069 .071 0 .521
P&L before tax/total assets (if loss) -.059 .21 -4.252 0
Dummy - aggregate loss .256 .437 0 1
Intangibles/total assets .192 .189 0 .924
Log(number of employees) 6.929 1.905 0 12.806
Domestic Groups
Tax bill/tot. assets 2,424 .013 .027 -.115 .143
Number total subsidiaries 8 17.71 1 249
P&L before tax/total assets (if gain) .053 .066 0 .483
P&L before tax/total assets (if loss) -.128 .338 -6.964 0
Dummy - making a loss .390 .488 0 1
Debt ratio .536 .353 .012 4.935
Intangibles/total assets .213 .224 0 .975
Log(number of employees) 6.023 2.040 0 11.695
(i) GUOs are grouped according to the situation in 2007. (ii) The variable ‘Number of sub-
sidiaries in tax havens’ and the dummy variables indicating the presence of those subsidiaries
are equal to zero for all MNCs without tax haven subsidiaries and for domestic groups.
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Table 11: ETRs, Losses, and Tax Charges Across Types of Companies
MNCs MNCs Domestic MNCs MNCs Domestic
with TH subs without TH subs groups with TH subs without TH subs groups
ETR - only positive values (per cent) ETR - all observations (per cent)
2003 32 34 34 23 21 18
2004 30 31 33 24 20 17
2005 30 30 32 24 21 17
2006 29 30 33 24 21 17
2007 28 30 31 23 20 17
Mean 30 31 33 23 21 17
Per cent of groups reporting losses Per cent of groups reporting negative tax charges
2003 23 31 40 17 24 40
2004 17 27 37 13 23 38
2005 15 24 38 12 21 36
2006 14 23 39 11 20 37
2007 15 23 39 11 21 34
Mean 17 25 40 12 22 37
Mean gain size (over total assets) Mean loss size (over total assets)
2003 .062 .058 .048 .032 .069 .165
2004 .074 .067 .051 .021 .061 .105
2005 .079 .071 .052 .020 .055 .126
2006 .083 .074 .057 .017 .062 .129
2007 .084 .074 .053 .019 .053 .124
Mean .077 .069 .053 .021 .059 .128
(i) Mean ETR calculated using only observations with both positive pre-tax profit and positive tax charges
(ii) Mean ETR calculated setting to zero observations with either losses or negative tax charge.
(iii) All values are consolidated.
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Table 12: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Tax bill/total assets OLS WG GMM-diff
Lag(tax bill/total assets) 0.292*** -0.023* 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.068***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Number of tax havens subsidiaries (α1) -0.00003 0.001 0.004 -0.006 -0.007
(0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Number of tax havens subsidiaries squared (α2) 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P&L/total assets (if gain) (α3) 0.228*** 0.226*** 0.341*** 0.332*** 0.336***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries (α4) 0.0004 0.004*** -0.0005 -0.002* -0.002**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries squared (α5) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy - aggregate loss -0.001 0.001 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries 0.000 0.000 -0.001* -0.002*** -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
X No. tax havens subsidiaries squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00003** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intangibles/total assets 0.007 0.008
(0.010) (0.010)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries 0.000 0.000 0.008 -0.001** -0.003*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(number of employees) -0.004 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries squared -0.00001** -0.00001**
(0.000) (0.000)
P&L/total assets (if loss) -0.007
(0.007)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries 0.002
(0.003)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries squared 0.000
(0.000)
Country-year dummies X X X X X
AR(1) -13.00 -12.62 -12.62
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -1.080 -0.995 -1.030
p-value [0.278] [0.320] [0.305]
Hansen over-identification test 64.48 86.64 96.63
Degrees of freedom (68) (92) (110)
p-value [0.462] [0.638] [0.815]
Observations 12,876 12,876 12,876 12,876 12,876
Number of groups 3,389 3,389 3,389 3,389 3,389
(i) Regressions run using pooled OLS (column 1), within-group estimator (column 2) and GMM-diff estimator
(Arellano and Bond (1991)) in columns 3 to 5. (ii) Standard errors in parentheses. (iii) Instruments used are
2nd and further lags of firm-level variables, 1st and 2nd lag of mean tax bill, and country-year dummies. Instru-
ments are collapsed as described in Roodman (2009). (iv) ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 13: Presence in Tax Havens Measured by Dummy Variables
Dependent variable: Tax bill/total assets (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag(tax bill/total assets) 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.083***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012)
Dummy - at least 1 tax haven subsidiary (d1) -0.048* -0.048* -0.050* -0.043
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026)
Dummy - 2 or more tax haven subsidiaries (d2) 0.025
(0.028)
Dummy - 3 or more tax haven subsidiaries (d3) 0.031
(0.039)
Dummy - 4 or more tax haven subsidiaries (d4) 0.010
(0.042)
Dummy - 30 or more tax haven subsidiaries (d5) -0.290
(0.475)
P&L/total assets (if gain) 0.351*** 0.349*** 0.354*** 0.348***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026)
X d1 -0.028 -0.035 -0.029 -0.077*
(0.044) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
X (d2) -0.016
(0.042)
X (d3) -0.027
(0.040)
X (d4) -0.044
(0.039)
X (d30) 0.064**
(0.028)
Making loss dummy 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
X (d30) -0.016***
(0.006)
Intangibles/total assets 0.014 0.008 0.011 0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Log(number of employees) -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
X (d1) 0.005 0.006* 0.006** 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
X (d2) -0.002
(0.003)
X (d3) -0.003
(0.003)
X (d4) -0.003
(0.003)
X (d30) -0.005**
(0.003)
AR(1) -13.58 -13.64 -13.68 -13.75
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -1.386 -1.318 -1.402 -1.030
p-value [0.166] [0.188] [0.161] [0.303]
Hansen over-identification test 98.44 114.6 106.8 88.21
Degrees of freedom (92) (92) (92) (92)
p-value [0.304] [0.0552] [0.138] [0.592]
(i) Number of observations is 12,876 and number of corporate groups is 3,389.
(ii) Coefficient estimates of the variable intangible intensity multiplied by different dummies are not
reported. They are insignificant. The same is true for the dummy recording an aggregate loss mul-
tiplied by the dummies for at least one, 2 or more, 3 or more, and 4 or more tax haven subsidiaries.
(iii) Regressions run using GMM-diff estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991)).
(iv) Standard errors in parentheses. (v) Country-year dummies used in all specifications.
(vi) Instruments used are 2nd and further lags of firm-level variables, 1st and 2nd lag of mean tax
bill, and country-year dummies. Instruments are collapsed as described in Roodman (2009).
(vii) ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 14: Within-group Changes in Tax Haven Dummies
No. of groups Per cent of total corporate groups
Dummy - at least one tax haven subsidiary 47 1.3
Dummy - two or more tax haven subsidiaries 37 1.1
Dummy - three or more tax haven subsidiaries 29 0.9
Dummy - four or more tax haven subsidiaries 19 0.6
Dummy - more than 30 tax haven subsidiaries 10 0.3
Total 3,389
(i) Number of corporate groups recording at least one change in the dummy.
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Table 15: Different Samples
Tax bill/total assets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag(tax bill/total assets) 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.085*** 0.070*** 0.069***
(0.023) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018)
Number of tax haven subsidiaries (α1) -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016)
Number of tax haven subsidiaries squared (α2) 0.0001 0.0001** 0.00003 0.0001** 0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
P&L/total assets (if gain) (α3) 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.318*** 0.330*** 0.361***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries (α4) -0.002* -0.002** -0.002* -0.002*** -0.014**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries squared (α5) 0.00002 0.00002** 0.00002* 0.00002*** 0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy - aggregate loss 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries squared 0.00003** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intangibles/total assets 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.010
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries -0.003* -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries squared 0.00004 0.00004*** 0.00005*** 0.00004*** 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(number of employees) -0.004 -0.004* -0.003 -0.005** -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries squared -0.00001** -0.0001*** -0.00001** -0.00002*** -0.00003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country-year dummies X X X X X
AR(1) -12.62 -13.87 -12.89 -13.88 -13.71
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -0.995 -1.136 -0.981 -1.092 -1.060
p-value [0.320] [0.256] [0.327] [0.275] [0.289]
Hansen over-identification test 86.64 84.28 87.02 83.97 91.22
Degrees of freedom (92) (92) (92) (92) (92)
p-value [0.638] [0.704] [0.627] [0.712] [0.503]
Observations 12,876 12,522 10,452 11,951 12,749
Number of groups 3,389 3,298 2,665 3,060 3,359
(i) Regressions run using GMM-diff estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991)). (ii) Standard errors in parentheses.
(iii) Instruments used are 2nd and further lags of firm-level variables, 1st and 2nd lag of mean tax bill, and country-year
dummies. Instruments are collapsed as described in Roodman (2009). (iv) Column 1 contains results for the entire
sample. In column column 2, GUOs resident in Ireland and Switzerland are dropped. In column 3 domestic entities are
dropped. In column 4 groups always reporting a consolidated loss are dropped. In column 5 companies with number of
tax haven subsidiaries larger than the 99th percentile (30) are dropped. (v) ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
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Table 16: Worldwide versus Territorial Systems of Taxation
Dependent variable: Tax bill/total assets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag(tax/total assets) 0.074*** 0.083*** 0.071*** 0.078*** 0.071*** 0.082***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of tax havens subs. (n) (α1) -0.008** -0.004 -0.007* -0.009** -0.010*** -0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of tax havens subs. squared (n2) (α2) 0.0002*** 0.0001* 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P&L/total assets (if gain) (α3) 0.214*** 0.217*** 0.229*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.219***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
X n (α4) -0.007** -0.008*** -0.006* -0.005* -0.008*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
X n2 (α5) 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
X dCR 0.148*** 0.131*** 0.133*** 0.140***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040)
X dUS 0.152*** 0.133***
(0.041) (0.041)
X dUK 0.077* 0.075*
(0.042) (0.042)
X dIE -0.046 -0.027
(0.111) (0.113)
X dCR X n 0.004 0.007** 0.003 0.002 0.006* 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
X dCR X n2 -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy - aggregate loss 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.018***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
X n -0.006*** -0.004** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
X n2 0.0002*** 0.0001* 0.0003*** 0.0002** 0.0002*** 0.0001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
X dCR -0.000 0.006 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
X dCR X n 0.004** 0.003 0.006*** 0.003* 0.004** 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
X dCR X n2 -0.0002** -0.000 -0.0003*** -0.0001* -0.0002** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intangibles/total assets 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.007 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
X n -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
X n2 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.00005*** 0.00006*** 0.00005*** 0.00006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(number of employees) -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
X n 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
X n2 -0.00002*** -0.00003*** -0.00002*** -0.00003*** -0.00003*** -0.00003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
X dCR 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
X dCR X n -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
X dCR X n2 0.000 0.00001* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AR(1) -13.90 -12.59 -13.76 -13.75 -13.82 -12.52
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -0.888 -1.066 -1.039 -0.869 -1.183 -1.251
p-value [0.357] [0.274] [0.364] [0.282] [0.206] [0.211]
Hansen over-identification test 140.0 147.2 133.6 137.4 151.2 156.1
Degrees of freedom (146) (146) (146) (146) (158) (158)
p-value [0.624] [0.457] [0.761] [0.682] [0.636] [0.527]
Observations 12,876 10,452 12,522 11,951 12,876 10,452
Number of groups 3,389 2,665 3,298 3,060 3,389 2,665
(i) Regressions run using GMM-diff estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991)).
(ii) Standard errors in parentheses. (iii) Instruments used are 2nd and further lags of firm-level variables, 1st and 2nd lag of mean tax
bill, and country-year dummies. Instruments are collapsed as described in Roodman (2009).
(iv) The dummy dCR takes value one if the group is headquartered in a country with a credit system. The dummies dUS, dUK, and dIE
take value one if the group is headquartered in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland, respectively.
(v) Column 1 and 5 show results for the entire sample. In column 2 and 6 domestic entities are dropped. In column 3, GUOs resident in
Ireland and Switzerland are dropped. In column 4 groups always reporting a consolidated loss are dropped.
(vi) Country-year dummies are used in all specifications. (vii) The variables n*dCR, n2*dCR, intangibles/tot. assets*dCR, intangibles/tot.
assets*n*dCR, and intangibles/tot. assets*n2*dCR not reported as insignificant in all specifications.
(viii) ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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